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COMMENTARY/Congress Dumps the International
Antidumping Code
EUGENIA S. PINTOS*
and PATRICIA J. MURPHY"
The International Antidumping Code, a product of the Summer 1967 Kennedy
Round talks,1 may become a dead letter if the traditional rivalry between
Congress and the Executive for control of United States foreign trade continues.
Until the conflict is resolved, the status of the Code is uncertain.
On June 30, 1967, most of the major trading nations announced agreement
on an international code dealing with the dumping of goods-one of the
most significant non-tariff issues discussed during the Kennedy Round of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).2 The Code was intended
to eliminate the unfair trade practice of price cutting by exporters in sales to
one country. Dumping, a major problem of international trade, has long been
recognized as a cause of distrust and hostility and is a potential cause of great
harm to the domestic industry of the importing country.3
Article VI of GATT condemns dumping and sets forth general criteria
governing assessment of antidumping duties by an importing country. In
1967, the United States became a party to the Agreement on Implementation
of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The first twelve
articles of this agreement constitute the International Antidumping Code.
Each party accepting the Code undertook to conform its domestic laws to the
provisions of the Code.4 The United States accepted the agreement without
reservation. Thus, "the United States is obliged internationally to abide by
the Code beginning July 1, 1968 .... "5 Since the United States is the leading
nation in world trade, its participation is vital to the Code's successful imple-
* B.A., George Washington University, 1964; J.D., Georgetown University Law
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1. The Kennedy Round results and the negotiations which led to them are described
in Rehm, The Kennedy Round of Trade Negotiations, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 403 (1968).
Mr. Rehm was a member of the U.S. negotiating team at the Kennedy Round.
2. Id. at 427-34. The GATT appears in 61 Stat. A 11 (1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 187. The Agreement of Implementation of Article VI of the GATT [hereinafter
Agreement] which includes the Code, appears in: 6 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 920-31
(1967); Legal Instruments Embodying the Results of the 1966-67 Trade Conference,
H.R. Doc. No. 184, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 3692-718 (1967).
3. J. VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1923).
4. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT, art. 14.
5. U.S. TARIFF COMM'N, REPORT ON S. CON. REs. 38, REGARDING THE INT'L ANTI-
DUMPING CODE 9 (1968) (reprinted in Hearings on International Antidumping Code Be-
lore the Senate Finance Comm., 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 329 (1968) (Appendix)).
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mentation. However, full United States participation may not occur. The
principal stumbling block is an alleged usurpation by the Executive of Con-
gress' powers under the Constitution.
United States Antidumping Laws
The term "dumping" is a word of art. Dumping occurs when there is both
price discrimination in sales to a particular country and resultant injury to a
domestic industry of that country. Antidumping laws are designed to protect
industries of an importing country from unfair pricing practices.
6
Under the Antidumping Act of 19217 (hereinafter the Act) duties are
imposed when "a class or kind of foreign merchandise is being, or is likely
to be, sold in the United States or elsewhere at less than its fair value . ... "8
It is further required that "an industry in the United States is being or is likely
to be injured, or is prevented from being established, by reason of the im-
portation of such merchandise into the United States." 9 There are two steps
in proceedings under the Act: a finding that goods are being sold at less than
fair value, 10 and a finding that these sales are injuring a domestic in-
dustry."1
Fair value determined under the Act by the Treasury Department is defined
as: (a) home country selling price, (b) selling price in a third country, or
(c) a constructed price, i.e., the sum of costs of production and the costs of
sale. 12 Upon an affirmative finding that goods are being sold at less than fair
value, the case is sent to the Tariff Commission, which investigates for injury.
13
While injury is not defined in the Act, the Tariff Commission has held that
it is anything more than de minimis harm.
14
Related to the question of injury is the ambit of the term "industry." Al-
though the Act does not specifically so provide, the Tariff Commission has
found that this term can include a well defined submarket, that is, a geo-
graphical area in which nearly all goods sold of the kind involved are pro-
duced by a small number of manufacturers. 15 Generally, this situation arises
6. Prosterman, Withholding of Appraisment Under the United States Antidumping
Act: Protectionism or Unfair-Competition Law? 41 WASH. L. REv. 315 (1966).
7. Antidumping Act of 1921, ch. 14, §§ 201-14, 42 Stat. 11, as amended, 19 U.S.C.
§§ 160-73 (1964) [hereinafter cited to 19 U.S.C. only].
8. 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1964).
9. Ibid.
10. 19 U.S.C. §§ 161-64 (1964).
11. Id. at § 160(a).
12. Id. at §§ 164, 165.
13. Id. at § 160(a).
14. Pig Iron From East Germany, Czechoslavakia, Romania, and the U.S.S.R., F.R.
Doc. 68-11853 (Sept. 25, 1968); Barber Chairs, F.R. Doc. 68-965 (Jan. 22, 1968);
Cast Iron Soil Pipe From Poland, F.R. Doc. 67-10575 (Sept. 5, 1967).
15. Cast Iron Soil Pipe From Poland, supra note 14.
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with goods which are very expensive to transport, thus limiting small pro-
ducers to selling only to nearby consumers. The Commission has held in such
cases that only the producers in the specific market need be injured to sup-
port imposition of antidumping duties.16 Finally, the Act provides for the
imposition of antidumping duties equal to the dumping margin, i.e., the dif-
ference between fair value and the price for which the goods are sold by the
exporting country.
17
The International Antidumping Code
Following the protectionist years of the depression, steps were taken to reduce
national barriers to world trade. Originally bilateral, the principal efforts since
1947 have been multilateral. Following World War Two there was wide-
spread fear that shortages of foreign exchange and low industrial output would
produce a tariff war among the trading nations. This, in 1948, led to the
first meeting of the GATT. Since then there have been five meetings of the
GATT, each resulting in some reductions of tariffs by member countries.
The Kennedy Round, the most recent of the GATT meetings, resulted in
an agreement to reduce tariff rates on the average about one third. Some trade
experts believe that the Kennedy Round may represent the last effective in-
centive to world trade which is possible by tariff reduction.18 Further advances,
it is felt, must come from the elimination of non-tariff barriers such as border
taxes, import licensing requirements, quotas, and countervailing duties. Precise
standards for fair international trade practices and a workable system of
enforcement have long been recognized as a prerequisite for total free trade.19
The International Antidumping Code represents a first step in that direction.
The International Antidumping Code (hereinafter the Code) imple-
ments and clarifies Article 6 of GATT. The Code does not apply as
domestic law in the countries which have excepted it-it is a statement of
the bounds permissible under GATT for the imposition of antidumping
duties. Each signatory is left to implement the Code as it feels imple-
mentation is necessary.20 The Code consists of twelve articles which generally
fall into five categories: the determination of dumping; 21 the determination
of injury; 22 investigative and administrative provisions; 23 measurement of anti-
16. Ibid.
17. 19 U.S.C. § 161(a). A seldom used statute, Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, tit.
VIII, § 801, 39 Stat. 798, 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1964), permits private suits for injury from
dumping. It has been used once.
18. See INT'L ECON. REV., June 1967, at 1-4.
19. See J. VINER, supra note 3.
20. INTERNATIONAL ANTMUMPINO CODE [hereinafter CODE] art. 14.
21. CODE art. 2.
22. CODE arts. 3, 4.
23. CODE arts. 5, 6, 7.
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dumping duties and provisional measures;24 antidumping action on behalf of a
third country.
25
Generally, antidumping duties greater than the dumping margin are for-
bidden.26 A determination may be made only when dumping is the principal
cause of material injury or threat of material injury.27 Dumping must be the
"principal cause of material retardation of the establishment of such an
industry" 28 if like goods are not manufactured in the importing country. When
used in the Code, injury means material injury.29 Valuation of injury is based
on an examination of all factors affecting an industry in question.30 The effect
of dumping is to be evaluated in relation to domestic production of the same
goods or their nearest equivalent.31 In exceptional circumstances the domestic
industry may be confined to a particular geographic area, 32 as under the
Tariff Commission's interpretation3 3 of the United States Antidumping Act.
Evidence of dumping and injury resulting therefrom must be produced before
an investigation is initiated; 34 both factors "shall be considered simultaneously
in the decision whether or not to initiate an investigation .... ,,35 A dumping
proceeding may be terminated without imposition of antidumping duties upon
the voluntary undertaking by the exporter to revise his prices so that the
dumping is eliminated, or to cease exporting to the area.36 Such an under-
taking lapses automatically if there is a finding of no injury.
37
The Code requires each signatory to bring its laws into conformity with it;38
each party must inform the other contracting parties of changes in its domestic
laws or procedures, 39 and must file an annual report of cases in which anti-
dumping duties have been assessed.40 A Committee on Antidumping Practices
was established to consult on problems concerning administration of antidump-
ing systems.
41
24. CODE arts. 8, 9, 10, 11.
25. CODE art. 12.
26. CODE art. 8(c).
27. CODE art. 3(a).
28. Ibid.
29. CODE art. 3 n.l.
30. CODE art. 3(b).
31. CODE art. 3(d).
32. CoDE art. 4(a) (ii).
33. Cast Iron Soil Pipe From Poland, supra note 14.
34. CODE art. 5(a).
35. CODE art. 5(b).
36. CODE art. 7(a).
37. CoD art. 7 (b).
38. CODE art. 14.
39. CODE art. 15.
40. CODE art. 16.
41. CODE art. 17.
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Congressional Opposition
Opposition to the International Antidumping Code began even before it was
formally signed by the United States. Throughout the dispute in Congress
and between Congress and the Executive there appeal two major arguments:
that the language of the Code and that of the Act require different results in
dumping cases, and that therefore the President had no authority to bind the
United States to the Code.
On May 9, 1967, Senator Vance Hartke (D.-Ind.) introduced S.1726, a bill
to amend the Antidumping Act of 1921.42 The bill provided "ground rules for
antidumping investigations and administrative proceedings." 43 Hartke stated
that the bill "provides the Congress the opportunity to put the Executive on
notice that the pendulum of power has swung too far in one direction and
will begin to move back where the Founding Fathers intended it to be."
44
He also stated, "[n]egotiations are presently being conducted-or have already
been concluded-in Geneva on an international antidumping code. This
satellite agreement to the Kennedy talks would necessarily encompass sub-
stantive changes in provisions of the 1921 act." 45 Senator Hartke then added,
"the decision on whether an agreement needs legislation to effect it, or approval
to make it legal, remains in the Congress and not within the executive."
46
On August 2, 1967, on the floor of the Senate, Senator Hartke repeated
his charge that the Code conflicted with the Act, and asserted that the Code
must therefore be submitted to the Senate for approval as a treaty.47 Changing
domestic law by Executive Agreement, Hartke contended, was beyond the
power of the President. He singled out three articles of the Code as in direct
conflict with the Act: Article 3, which requires that a determination of injury
be made only if dumped imports are demonstrably the principal cause; Article
4, which defines domestic industry as including well defined submarkets for
purposes of determining injury and Article 5, which requires simultaneous
consideration of both injury and sales at less than fair value in preliminary
decisions as to whether an investigation is called for.
48
In the face of these alleged inconsistencies, Hartke continued, the Executive
exceeded the negotiating powers granted under the Trade Expansion Act of
1962, which was the basic grant of authority to negotiate the tariff cuts of
the Kennedy Round. Hartke disputed the contention that the Executive had any
authority other than delegation by Congress empowering it to bind the United
42. 113 CoNG. REC. S6496-98 (daily ed. May 9, 1967).
43. Id. at S6497.
44. Ibid.
45. Id. at S6496.
46. Id. at S6497.




States to the Code.49 This same objection had been voiced in Senate Con-
current Resolution 100,50 which declared the President had no authority to
agree to change an act of Congress without that body's consent. This resolu-
tion was passed only by the Senate.
Senators Scott (R.-Pa.) and Hartke then proceeded, on August 2, 1967, to
introduce Senate Concurrent Resolution 38, which advises the President that
Congress believes the Code to conflict with domestic legislation, and therefore
it should not be implemented without the advise and consent of the Senate. 5'
The resolution was sent to the Senate Finance Committee on August 3, 1967,
and was then referred by that Committee to the Tariff Commission and several
other agencies for comment. No action was subsequently taken on the Resolu-
tion, but in March the Tariff Commission reported to the Committee that the
Code and Act conflicted.
On August 23, 1967, Senator Javits (R.-N.Y.) replied to Hartke's objections
on the Senate floor.52 The main objective of the antidumping negotiations, he
stated, was "to prevent the proliferation of highly restrictive antidumping
laws and procedures in the industrialized nations of the world."5 3 In Javits'
view the Code would measurably lessen future protective barriers against United
States exports and against international trade in general.5 4 Concerning the
requirement of the Code that the dumped imports be demonstrably the prin-
cipal cause of material injury or threat of material injury, Javits asserted that
the Act should also be construed in terms of material injury.
55
Senator Javits found the Code's submarket notion, Article 4 (a), as reasonable
and consonant with that used by the Tariff Commission in escape clause
cases.56 Under Article 4(a) regional markets can be viewed as separate in-
dustries in exceptional circumstances. Hartke's claim was that this article con-
tains an exceptional and restrictive definition of a segmented industry; Javits
agreed that the United States Antidumping Act lacked such terminology but
viewed the article as neither an inconsistent interpretation of the United




50. 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
51. S. Con. Res. 38, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), provides that it is the sense of
Congress: (1) that the provisions of the Code conflict with the Act; (2) that the
Code should be submitted to the Senate for approval as provided by Article II, section
2, clause 2 of the Constitution; (3) that the Code should come into effect in the United
States only upon passage of implementing legislation by Congress.
52. 113 CoNo. REc. S12106-09 (daily ed. August 23, 1967).
53. Id. at 12106.
54. Ibid.
55. Supra note 52, at 12106-07.
56. Id. at 12107.
57. Ibid.
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Senator Javits contended that Article 5(b), requiring simultaneous con-
sideration of sales at less than fair value and injury, referred only to slight
evidence of injury as a preliminary to investigation. The key question, he felt,
is the meaning of the word evidence--does it mean full proof of injury or
only a "modest and preliminary indication of injury?" Javits noted that the
injury is not to be investigated until the Treasury Department has determined
that a dumping situation exists. He observed that the prior practice of the
Treasury Department had been to request some indication of injury; under the
Code the Treasury would simply return to that procedure.
58
Under Article 10(a) of the Code provisional measures will be taken only
after a determination of sales at less than fair value and a preliminary determi-
nation of injury. Javits defended the article as meaning that the Treasury
Department can act against dumped imports on the initial evidence of injury
and proceed with its determination of dumping; the question of injury would
be taken up after the case is referred to the Tariff Commission.
59
The important consideration, Javits asserted, was not whether the President
has authority to interpret domestic law, but whether he exercises it consistently
with the domestic act. He argued that the international agreement is valid
and need not give way to the domestic act, which would remain paramount in
case of inconsistency. Javits contended, "it is the judiciary which under our
system of a separation of powers is the competent body to consider and resolve
such an issue." 60 He further stated, "[i]nsofar as any private person believes that,
following the entry into force of the code, the act is being improperly ad-
ministered, he can certainly seek judicial relief, for . . . the act not being
superseded by a treaty remains paramount if it cannot be construed consistently
with the executive agreement. '61 In the final analysis, Javits asserted, "[the
Code] is not a paramount law, or even a law, that is it is nothing but-if you
will-a set of regulations implementing a law."
62
On September 27, 1967, Senator Hartke replied, emphasizing that prior
Tariff Commission decisions are inconsistent with the Code.63 Senator Javits,
however, retorted, "the question is not the consistency of the code with prior
Tariff Commission decisions but with the act itself. Indeed, the Tariff Com-
mission decisions themselves do not have that degree of consistency which
would suggest a series of decisions having the force of law. Granted that the
code does delimit the discretion of the Tariff Commission, my point is that
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. Supra note 52, at 12108.
61. Ibid.
62. Supra note 52, at 12109.
63. 113 CONG. REc. S13792-94 (daily ed. September 27, 1967).
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the standards that the code establishes are both reasonable and consistent
with the act."
64
Senator Hartke contended that one of the most clear cut inconsistencies
between the Antidumping Act and the Code is Article 8(e), which provides
that antidumping duties will not be imposed if the exporter gives adequate
assurance that he will cease dumping in the area. He stated that under domestic
law, the violating dumper receives no such reprieve-that the duty is imposed
automatically under the Act.65
On March 13, 1968, the Tariff Commission reported its findings to the
Senate Finance Committee.66 Three of the five commissioners found that the
Act and the Code conflicted very substantially, and that several recent cases
would have been decided differently had the Code been in effect.67 Com-
missioner Clubb, one of the majority, also pointed out that the Code could
not be applied even where it did not conflict with the Act because the Presi-
sident had no authority to negotiate where Congress had occupied the field.68
Two commissioners disagreed with the majority, asserting that the Act and
the Code were consistent.
69
The conflict between the Executive and the Legislative branches of govern-
ment thus becoming crystalized, the President added further fuel to the contro-
versy on April 3, 1968 by attempting to fill a long standing vacancy on the
Tariff Commission with a proponent of the Code, Bernard Norwood, a top
aide on Ambassador Roth's staff and chairman of the Trade Staff of the
Office of the President's Special Representative for Trade Relations. No
hearings were held on the nomination, and after a protracted period of Senate
inactivity, the President withdrew Norwood's nomination on October 8, 1968.
Immediately after the nomination, Senator Hartke on April 4, 1968 made
a speech on the Senate floor in which he highlighted the Tariff Commission's
majority report, and emphasized the separation of powers issue.70 Hartke
pointed to the nomination of Norwood as the latest of the Executive's attempts
to blur the separation of powers controversy, and to allegedly usurp power
which constitutionally belongs to the Congress.
71
Hartke also condemned the Treasury Department's proposed regulations as
a violation of separation of powers. The gist of his position was that the new
regulations not merely streamline existing procedure within the limits of ad-
64. Id. at 13794.
65. Ibid.
66. U.S. TARIFF COMM'N, REPORT ON S. CON. REs. 38, REGARDING THE INT'L
ANTIDUMPINO CODE (1968) [hereinafter cited as TARIFF COMM'N REPORT].
67. Id. at 19.
68. Id. at 37-39.
69. Id. at 49-60.
70. 114 CoNG. REC. S3867-71 (daily ed. April 4, 1968).
71. Id. at 3870.
1968]
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ministrative discretion set by the Antidumping Act of 1921, but also transcend
those limits.72 Senator Javits promptly disagreed with Hartke on April 10,
1968. The gist of Javits' argument was that the Code constitutes more or less
a restatement of existing administrative practice under the Antidumping Act
of 1921.
73
On June 27, 1968, the Senate Finance Committee held hearings on the
Code. 74 The hearings also included an inquiry into Senator Hartke's bill,
S. 1726, to amend the United States Antidumping Act, and other measures
relating to the Code, including the new regulations promulgated by the Treasury
Department. On July 1, 1968 the Treasury Department promulgated new
antidumping regulations designed to make the Code operative. 75 On July 17,
Senator Long (D.-La.) introduced, on behalf of himself and the Senate Finance
Committee, an amendment to H.R. 17324, a House bill to extend the Re-
negotiation Act and the Renegotiation Board. 76 The amendment embodied the
terms of Senate Concurrent Resolution 38; its effect would have been to
suspend implementation of the Treasury Regulations. On July 26, having been
approved by the Senate Finance Committee, the amendment was reported
to the Senate and sent back to the Committee with instructions to report the
Renegotiation Act out with the amendment for vote by the Senate.77 On
September 9, the entire package of legislation was passed by voice vote in the
Senate, 78 on September 11 it was officially approved, and the bill with amend-
ment was sent to Conference Committee.
79
On October 3 the Conference Committee reported out a compromise pack-
age, Title II of which deals with the administration of the Antidumping
Act of 1921.80 This amendment, somewhat different from that passed originally
by the Senate, provides:
Nothing contained in the International Antidumping Code . . . shall
be construed to restrict the discretion of the United States Tariff
Commission in performing its duties and functions under the Anti-
dumping Act, 1921, and in performing their duties and functions
under such Act the Secretary of the Treasury and the Tariff Com-
mission shall-
72. Id. at 3870-71.
73. 114 CoNo. Rac. S4061-68 (daily ed. April 10, 1968).
74. Hearings on International Dumping Code Before the Senate Finance Comm., 90th
Cong., 2d Sess., (1968) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
75. The new regulations were first proposed on October 23, 1967. 32 Fed. Reg.
14955-65. After modification they were finally promulgated on May 29, 1968. F.R. Doc.
68-6596 (June 1, 1968), 33 Fed. Reg. 8243-51.
76. 114 CONG. REc. S8742 (daily ed. July 17, 1968).
77. 114 CONG. REc. S9442, S9511 (daily ed. July 26, 1968).
78. 114 CoNo. REC. S10474-78 (daily ed. September 9, 1968).
79. 114 CoNo. REC. S10613 (daily ed. September 11, 1968).
80. H.R. REP. No. 1951, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
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(1) resolve any conflict between the International Antidumping
Code and the Antidumping Act, 1921, in favor of the Act as
applied by the agency administering the Act, and
(2) take into account the provisions of the International Anti-
dumping Code only insofar as 'they are consistent with the Anti-
dumping Act, 1921, as applied by the agency administering the
Act. 81
Provision is also made for an annual report to Congress by the President of
all actions taken by the Treasury Department and the Tariff Commission
under the Antidumping Act. Such report is to "[a]nalyze with respect to each
determination . . . the manner in which the Antidumping Act, 1921, has been
administered to take into account the provisions of the International Anti-
dumping Code .... ,,82 A summary of antidumping actions taken by other
signatories to the Code is also to be included.83 On October 7, 1968, the Senate
passed the compromise bill,84 as did the House on October 10.8
The Code and the Act Compared
There are two points at which the International Antidumping Code and the
Antidumping Act of 1921 are most seriously in conflict: determination of
injury, and procedure in application. Article 3, of the Code sets down the fol-
lowing criteria for a determination of injury:
A determination of injury shall be made only when the authorities
concerned are satisfied that the dumped imports are demonstrably
the principal cause of material injury or of threat of material injury
to a domestic industry or the principal cause of material retardation
of the establishment of such an industry. In reaching their decision
the authorities shall weigh, on the one hand, the effect of dumping
and, on the other hand, all other factors taken together which may be
adversely affecting the industry.
86
Under the Antidumping Act of 1921, the Tariff Commission, after an affirma-
tive finding of sales at less than fair value by the Treasury Department, shall
determine "whether an industry in the United States is being or is likely to
be injured, or is prevented from being established, by reason of the importation
of such merchandise into the United States. '87
There are three major points in injury determinations under the Code:
principal cause, material injury, and the weighing of all other factors affecting
81. Id. at 1-2.
82. Id. at 2.
83. Ibid.
84. 114 CONG. REc. S12163-69 (dail, ed. October 7, 1968).
85. 114 CONG. REc. H9747-54 (daily ed. October 10, 1968).
86. CODE art. 3(a).
87. 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1964).
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the industry. The Code requirement that dumping is the "principal" cause of
injury would seem to differ from the Act. While it is possible that the Code
usage could be read to mean the same as "material" injury, which the Tariff
Commission has held is required under the Act of 1921,88 more likely it is the
view of a majority of the Commission that: "[i]t would seem . .. that the
negotiators intended that dumping duties be sanctioned only in those cases
where the 'dumped' goods are individually the cause of material injury and
that such injury is greater than the injury caused by all other causal factors."
8 9
The representatives of the Executive branch disagreed with the Tariff Com-
mission's reading of the Code: "The term 'the principal cause' . . . does not
require that dumped imports be that cause which is greater than all other
causes combined of material injury. It therefore allows injury determinations
consistent with the requirements of the Act."'9
This requirement of the Code provoked considerable discussion in a hearing
on the Code held by the Senate Finance Committee. Senators Hartke and
Long strongly felt that the Code and the Act were in conflict on this point,
while the administration spokesmen disagreed with them.91 An administration
witness declared, "principal cause does not mean the cause greater than all
other causes combined, but rather the cause greater than any other cause."
' '
He stated further, "[a]ll I am saying is that this is our interpretation. I do not
deny that the provision you cited could lead one to the other conclusion. All
I am saying is that it is our interpretation. We stand by it and think on this
basis it is consistent with the act."93 Senator Long took exception to this view:
What you say on page 63 suggests that picture of a pure woman
standing there blindfolded with a scale in her hands and on one side
of the scale there is what can be said for dumping and on
the other side what can be said for all other causes of injury.
If the scale is heavier on this side than it is on the other, then this
is the side on which justice must go. That concept would indicate
that you put all the other causes on the one side and you put this
cause on this side, the dumping, and if all the other causes outweigh
the dumping, that you would say that is not the principal cause of
the injury.
94
Even if "principal" under the Code means "the cause greater than any other
cause," this would still be inconsistent with the Act as it is applied by the
88. Conner & Buschlinger, The United States Antidumping Act: A Timely Survey, 7
VA. J. INT'L LAW 117, 137 (1966).
89. TARIFF COMM'N REPORT, at 12.
90. Hearings, at 286.
91. Hearings, at 25-6, 30, 41-2.
92. Id. at 41.




Tariff Commission, which stated: "The Act does not require a determination
that dumped imports are adversely affecting an industry 'to a degree greater
than any one or combination of other factors adversely affecting an industry ....
The Commission in making its determinations with respect to injury under the
Act has not weighed the injury caused by such imports against other injuries
that an industry might be suffering."9 5 On balance, it would seem that the
Code's requirement that dumping be the "principal" cause of injury differs
from the applicable standards of the Act.
96
Whether the Code's requirement of "material" injury differs from the Act
is largely a question of semantics. The Tariff Commission majority stated that
the Act similarly had been applied to require "material" injury which they
defined as "any injury more than de minimis."97 It is reasonable to expect that
the minimum injury necessary to constitute material injury will become ap-
parent, if not explicitly defined. The requirement in the Code that all factors
affecting an industry be considered along with the dumping, however, seems
to depart substantially from the Tariff Commission's practice under the Act.98
Taken as a whole, these Code requirements depart importantly from the
provisions of the Act as they have been applied. The kind of relatively flexible
proceedings which have characterized the application of the Act would be
a thing of the past if the Code applied, and the Commission's discretion would
be rigorously limited under the Code. Such a result seems peculiarly out of
place in the case of an act which is intended to prevent unfair trade practices
of considerable importance and which appear in myriad forms.99
Procedure under the Code would differ from that under the Act. Under
the Act, a case is first brought before the Treasury Department for a finding
on sales at less than fair value. If an affirmative finding is made, the case is
sent to the Tariff Commission for a determination of injury.100 If the Code
governed, it would be necessary to make these determinations simultaneously.
This, in practice, would mean that either the Treasury or the Tariff Com-
95. TARIFF COMM'N REPORT, at 11.
96. Ibid.
97. There is no legislative history for the Code. The closest approach to such clarifying
material is statements by United States officials who participated in the negotiations.
Even from these statements there seems to be conflict between the intended meaning of
the Code and what the Tariff Commission, in cases applying the Act, has found the Act
to mean. It should also be noted that, unless procedure in dumping cases is changed,
the Tariff Commission is responsible for determining injury and for construing the Act
and the Code in such determinations. Since a majority of the Commission has ex-
pressed its view that the two conflict, a case involving this question is likely to come
to that conclusion.
98. TARIFF COMM'N REPORT, at 12.
99. The same criticism might be leveled against the effect of the Renegotiation Act
since it requires the Tariff Commission and the Treasury Department to apply the Act in
accord with their previous decisions.
100. 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1964).
1968]
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mission would have to make both findings. Since the Treasury Department
is better equipped by its authority over customs to make the field investiga-
tions on sales at less than fair value, it seems likely that the entire procedure
would be undertaken by the Treasury Department.101
Conclusion
With the passage of the Renegotiation Act, 102 and its signature by the President
on October 24,103 the question of the President's power to change a domestic
statute by executive agreement seems moot.1° 4 As a matter of law, the Tariff
Commission and the Treasury Department are now required to apply the
Act, as they applied it in the past, in any case where the Code and Act con-
flict. Perhaps the only substantial issue of Presidential power remaining is
whether the "occupation of the field" doctrine bars any application of the
Code, even where it does not conflict with the Act. Under this doctrine,
once Congress has exercised its power over a subject area, if it has such
power, the President is barred from action in the same "field."' 05 At the very
least, the Code will have no effect where it conflicts with the Act; such conflicts
involve substantial points.
Although it cannot be predicted with certainty how the Treasury Depart-
ment and the Tariff Commission will decide cases in which both Act and
Code apply, it is reasonable to assume that the Tariff Commisson will decide
cases consistently with its report to the Senate Finance Committee. 1° 6 Thus,
the relevant question is how far the Tariff Commission and the Treasury
Department will go in finding the two in conflict. Since the Code and the Act
are in substantial conflict at various important points, it would seem that the
International Antidumping Code is largely a dead letter as far as any active
participation by the United States is concerned.
101. It seems unlikely that a procedure of each making duplicate inquiries would
be adopted.
102. Notes 84, 85 supra.
103. Pub. L. No. 90-634 (Oct. 24, 1968).
104. The mooting of the separation of powers conflict removes the objection that
internal bickering should not be allowed to interfere with the effective transaction of
foreign affairs.
105. This question was raised by Commissioner Clubb, TARIFF COMM'N REPORT,
at 37-39.
106. Supra note 66.
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